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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD V. TOLMAN, 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
K-MART 
a Utah 
DONG, 
and Appellant, ) 
ENTERPRISES OF UTAH, INC., ) 
corporation, and JEFF T. ) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Case No. 14,625 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for embarrassment, 
humiliation and disgrace arising out of the false arrest 
of plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was decided upon defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. From a summary judgment for 
defendants of no cause of action the plaintiff appeals. 
NATURE OF RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have judgment of the 
Court reversed and a trial granted to determine evidence 
and to determine damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 16, 1974, Plaintiff Donald V. Tolman 
entered the place of business of Defendant K-Mart Enterprises 
-1-
of Utahf Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "K-Mart") for the 
purpose of purchasing a can of body putty. He proceeded 
directly to the automotive department. After examining 
several different brands he selected a can and proceeded 
to the front of the store. Before arriving at the checkout 
counter he noticed that there were two price tags on the 
can. He returned to the automotive department and picked 
out another kit and started walking towards the checkout 
counter. As he was standing in line, he noticed that there 
were two (2) labels on this kit too. Plaintiff was in a 
hurry and rather than walk back to the automotive department 
and look for a can with only the lower price, he just 
peeled off the label with the higher price. He then paid 
for the item and proceeded to leave the store. 
At this point Defendant Jeff Dong stopped plaintiff 
and informed him he was a security officer. He told plaintiff 
that he was under arrest. Plaintiff asked what it was that 
he had supposedly done to which Defendant Dong stated that 
that was what they all said. 
Defendant Dong then called to another employee—the 
store manager—in a loud voice saying that he has just arreste 
plaintiff because plaintiff had tried to defraud K-Mart. 
The store manager asked plaintiff if he would walk t 
the back of the store and not cause any disturbance. The 
store manager and Defendant Dong then escorted plaintiff to 
the rear of the store with one walking in front and the other 
-2-
to plaintiff's side. Plaintiff was made to empty his pockets 
and then they asked to see the package. Defendant Dong took 
out the car body kit that plaintiff had just purchased 
and stated that he had seen plaintiff taking labels off 
containers and putting them on other items. Plaintiff 
objected and offered to take defendants to the area he had 
bought the item and show them that there were other kits 
that also had more than one price tag. However, defendants 
refused to go and examine the other body kits. 
At this time. Defendant Dong produced a form 
which purportedly relieved K-Mart of any liability or 
responsibility for plaintifff's arrest. Defendants 
requested palintiff to sign said form with the additional 
impetus that if he would sign it the judge would be 
easier on plaintiff. Plaintiff refused to sign, at which 
time he was informed that if he did not they were going 
to call the police. However, defendants did not call the 
police right then, but continued to try and convince 
plaintiff to sign the release of liability. 
Finally the police were called and plaintiff 
was escroted to the front of the store and when outside 
was handcuffed and placed in the seat of the police car 
and escorted to the Orem City Jail. Here he was photographed 
and booked. 
Plaintiff remained at the jail approximately 
-3-
one and one-half (1 1/2) hours before being released 
on bail. He went to Brigham Young University where, 
after telling his brother what had happened, they 
returned to K-Mart to purchase another of the kits 
as evidence. However, all of approximately two dozen 
of the same kits had been removed and there remained 
only an empty space. At the criminal trial plaintiff 
was found not guilty and several items were placed in 
evidence, which had two or three and as many as six or 
eight price tags on a single item as claimed by plaintiff, 
all different prices. 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
upon the basis that Section 78-11-29, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, which reads as to actions for false 
imprisonment is applicable to actions for false arrest. 
Plaintiff asserts: (1) that false imprisonment and false 
arrest are not the same and 12) therefore, false arrest 
should be governed by Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53, as amended, which provides that "an action for relief 
not otherwise provided for by law" shall be brought within 
four years. 
POINT I 
FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT ARE NOT THE 
SAME CAUSES OF ACTION 
Black's Law Dictionary defines arrest as: 
"To deprive a person of his liberty by 
legal authority. Taking under real or 
assumed authority, custody of another 
for the purpose of holding or detaining 
-4-
him to answer a criminal charge 
or civil demand." 
Imprisonment on the other hand is defined by 
Blackfs Law Dictionary as: 
The act of putting or confining a 
man in prison; the restraint of a 
man's personal liberty; coercion 
exercised upon a person to prevent 
the free exercise of his powers of 
locomotion. 
Thus, it is apparent that there does exist 
some difference between false arrest and false imprison-
ment due to the very differences in the meaning of the 
two words. 
As further evidence of the difference in 
meaning, plaintiff-appellant cites Fuller v. Zinik 
Sporting Goods Co., (1975) 538 P.2d 1036, where plaintiff 
brought suit for false arrest, false•imprisonment and 
malicious prosecution. Thompson v. General Finance Co., 
(1970) 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269, speaks of an action for 
false arrest or for false imprisonment. 
In many of the false imprisonment cases, they 
speak of false arrest or false imprisonment cases. 
Obviously there must be a distinction between the two or 
else it would be unnecessary to mention false arrest in 
connection with false imprisonment. 
That a distinction between false arrest and 
false imprisonment does exist is apparent from the 
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opinion in Ogulin v. Jeffries, (1953) 121 Cal. App.2d 211, 263 
P.2d 75, which cites the following at page 78: 
A person detained pursuant to a lawful 
arrest cannot bring an action for the 
false arrest itself, Stubbs v. Abercrombic, 
42 Cal. App. 170, 183 P. 458. However, 
an action for false imprisonment arising 
from unlawful detention may be maintained 
if the defendant unlawfully detains the 
prisoner for an unreasonable period of time 
and unnecessarily delays taking him before 
a magistrate within a reasonable time after 
his arrest. Williams v. Zelzah Warehouse 
Co., 126 Cal. App. 28, 14 P.2d 177, Section 
849 Penal Code, Section 145 Penal Code, 
Vernon v. Plumas Lumber Co., 71 Cal. App. 
112, 234 P. 869, 35 C.J.S. False Imp. § 51, 
P. 582; Roseman v. Korb, 311 Mass 75, 4U NE"-*a 
255. 
This is cited as correct in Kaufman v. Brown, (1949) 
93 Cal. App.2d 508, 209 P.2d 156. 
A further distinction between the two is cited 
in McGlone v. Landreth, (1948) 200 Okla 425; 195 P.2d 
268. 
As stated in 22 Am. Jur. , Section 3, there is 
a distinction in the manner in which causes of action for 
false arrest and false imprisonment arise. The distinction 
is there stated as follows at page 354: 
In a false arrest, false imprisonment 
exists, but the detention is by reason 
of an asserted legal authority to 
enforce the processes of the law; in 
a false imprisonment, the detention is 
purely a matter between private persons 
for a private end, and there is no 
intention of bringing the person detained 
before a Court, or of otherwise securing 
the administration of the law. 
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This is further cited in Allsup v. Skaggs Drug 
Center, ( ) 203 Okla 325, 223 P.2d 530. 
Though not controlling in the instant case it 
should be noted that the Statute of Limitations of Pennsylvania 
12 P.S. § 31 states: 
Actions of trespass, of assault, menace, 
battery, wounding, imprisonment or any 
of them, within two years next after the 
cause of such actions or suits and not 
after 
In 12 P.S. § 51: 
Evexy suit to recover damages for malicious 
prosecution or for false arrest, ^ust be 
brought within one year from the date of 
the occurrance of such right of action, and 
not thereafter.1 
This points up the fact that at least one legislature had 
recognized the fact that there is a distinction between false 
arrest and false imprisonment. The Pennsylvania legislature 
has seen fit to impose different limitations on each of 
this causes of action. 
The leading Utah case on the distinction existing 
between false arrest and false imprisonment is Hepworth v. 
Covey Bros. Amusement Co., (1939) 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507. 
Wherein at page 599 it states: 
We wish to invite attention to a 
distinction in the law which we believe 
has been confused in the briefs. False 
arrest may be committed only by one who 
has legal authority to arrest or who 
has pretended legal authority to arrest. 
False imprisonment may be committed by 
anyone who imprisons without legal right. 
One who commits a false arrest of another 
-7-
may be liable in damages for false imprison-
ment, but from this we must not reason that 
if there is a failure of proof of false 
arrest of necessity there is a failure of 
proof of false imprisonment. False arrest 
is merely one means of committing a false 
imprisonment. False imprisonment may be 
committed without any thought of attempting 
an arrest. 
Though the distinctions are fine, it is apparent tha 
the distinction does exist. A further quotation from a 
footnote in Banles v. Food Town, (1957), 98 So.2d 719 at 
page 721: 
In the false or unlawful arrest, the 
detention is by reason of an asserted 
legal authority to enforce the processes 
of law; it is one means of committing a 
false imprisonment, although a false 
imprisonment Cwhich includes an unreason-
able detention) may be committed without 
an arrest. 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment 
§ 2,6; 22 Am Jur. False Imprisonment § 3 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TO BE CONSTRUED SO AS 
TO INCLUDE ONLY THOSE CASES CLEARLY WITHIN THE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to give 
timely notice to an adverse party so he can assemble a defense 
when the facts are fresh. This is cited in Elkins v. Derby, 
(1974) 115 Cal. Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81, at page 86: 
That the purpose in the oft-quoted 
words of Justice Holme is to *[prevent] 
surprises through the revival of claims 
that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded and witnesses have disappeared.' 
In Los Angeles County v. Security First National 
-8-
Bank of L.A., (1948) 84 Cal. App.2d 575, 191 P.2d 78f 
at page 82: 
Statutes of limitations are designed 
to prevent the resurgence of stale 
claims after the lapse of long periods 
of time as a result of which loss of 
papers, disappearance of witnesses, 
feeble recollections, make ineffectual 
or extremely difficult a fair presentation 
of the case. But they are not intended 
as defenses to just demands of comparatively 
recent origin. When the facts relied upon 
leave it clearly in doubt whether the 
case is within the statute pleaded courts 
should not indulge a strained construction 
in order to support the plea. McGrath v. 
Butt County, 30 Cal.App. 2d 734, 
738, 87 P.2d 381. 
The various Supreme Courts of sister states have 
gone on to declare from this statement of the general purposes 
of the statutes of limitation that the facts of the case must 
clearly bring it within the provisions of the law sought to 
be applied. 
In Mowry v. City of Virginia Beach, (1956) 198 Va 
205, 93 SE 2d 323, it states at page 326: 
It is generally held that statutes of 
limitations are ordinarily favored and 
are entitled to a reasonable construction; 
but they may not be applied to cases not 
clearly within their provisions. Their 
determination is not governed by equitable 
questions but by the language of the statute 
construed according to the manifest intention 
of the legislature, and, when free from 
ambiguity, should be construed according 
to the usual meaning of the words and as 
a whole. 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, 
§ 36 P. 910 and 34 Am. Jur. Limitations of 
Actions, § 37, page 40. 
Bradford v. City of Shreveport, (1974) 294 S.2d 855, 
at page 859: 
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It is well settled that prescriptive 
statutes are strictly construed and the 
facts of the case must bring the action 
clearly within specific provisions of the 
law sought to be applied. Prescription 
cannot be extended by analogy from one 
subject to another. (citations omitted) 
In Pugneir v. Ramharter, (1957) 275 Wis 70, 81 
NW2d 38, 81 ALR 2d 522 at page 528, a statute of limitations 
was announced as a defense against an action against a 
town chairman. The statute referred to a three year 
limitation or actions against a sheriff, coroner, town clerk 
or constable for breach of duty. The Court ruled that an 
action against a town chairman was not banned by this 
statute. It then >7ent on to say: 
A statute of limitations should not be 
applied to cases not clearly within 
its provisions. It should not be 
extended by construction. 53 C.J.S. 
Limitations of Actions § 3(b), pp 912-913. 
Statutes creating limitations are to 
be reasonably and fairly construed, but 
should not be extended by construction. 
Fish v. Collins, (1916) 164 Wis. 457, 
160 N.W. 163. 
United Carbon Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. (1 
89 So.2d 209, 230 La 709 at 212: 
It is equally well settled that prescriptive 
statutes are strictly construed, and the 
facts of the case must bring the action 
clearly within the specific provisions of 
the law sought to be applied. (citations 
omitted) 
It has been further stated in Williams v. Bailey 
COkla) (1954) 26b p.2d 868, at page 873: 
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It is a postulate that a limitations 
statute only the particular 
actions which it recites,, and no others, 
and that a statute can be given such force 
only as the Legislature could impart 
to it within the limitations of the State 
and Federal Constitutions. 
This view was again cited in Roberts v. Roberts, 
(Wyo) (1945) 162 p.2d 117 at 121: 
It was said in an early case that 'the 
doctrine is well established in the 
construction of Statutes of Limitations 
that cases within the reason, but not 
within the words of the statute are not 
barred, but may be considered as omitted 
cases, which the legislature have not 
deemed proper to limit . . . Nor is this 
doctrine at war with that so frequently 
held in the books, that the statute is 
to be liberally expounded. 
In 37 C.J.S. 691, it is said that: 
It is a familiar principle that a statute 
of limitations should not be applied to 
cases not clearly within its provisions; 
it should not be extended by construction. 
In Hatch v. Spofford, 26 Conn. 432, 438 
a case cited by Wood, supra, it is said 
that statutes of limitations are "to 
be construed and applied, according to 
the exact and specific language of the 
enactments, and not upon any supposed 
general and abstract principles of 
equity. Courts may not extend them 
to cases, because they seem to be of 
an analogous character. 
Another case which follows this reasoning is 
Gibson v. Gibson, (1966) 240 Ark. 827, 402 SW 2d 647 where 
at page 648 the court stated: 
We note at the outset of this discussion 
that this court has many times expressed 
its reluctance to apply a statute of 
limitations to actions not specifically 
enumerated therein. 
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The statute of limitations as a defense has 
been further limited in other sister states. 
Cannavina y. Poston, (1942) 13 Wash.2d 182, 124 
P.2d 787 at page 789: 
While we have long recognized the rule 
in this state that a plea of the statute 
of limitations is not an unconscionable 
defense, we have also recognized and so 
stated that it is fnot such a meritorious 
defense that either the law or the fact 
should be strained in aid of it1. Bain v. 
Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 10 P.2d 
ZZb, 278 [emphasis supplied] 
This view of the statute of limitations has been 
followed in Hardbarger v. Deal, (1962) 258 N.C. 31, 
127 SE 2d 771; Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. State of Washington, 
(1965) 66 Wash.2d 576, 403 P.2d 880; Rochester v. Tulp, 
(1959) 54 Wash.2d 71, 337 P.2d 1062; Wickwire v. Heard, 
(1951) 37 Wash.2d 748, 226 P.2d 192, 23 ALR 2d 1323. 
In Gibson, supra, paqe 649, the court cited from 
Breining v. Lipincott, 126 Ark. 77, 187 SW ""2d 915, page 916: 
The statute is plain and the intent 
of the legislature must be gathered 
from the words rised and where the 
words rised are unambiguous, courts 
cannot add to or take from them their 
obvious meaning. 
In an Iowa case, Sprung v. Rasmussen, (1970), 
180 NW. 2d 430 at 433, the court said: 
Courts do not favor defense of statute of 
limitations and statutes of limitations 
should not be applied to cases which do 
not come within their provisions. 
Pugnier v. Ramharter, 275 Wis 70, 81 
NW"2d 38 
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The contention as expressed in Point I of this 
brief is that there are differences which exist between 
false arrest and false imprisonment. These differences 
should be recognized and as stated in the cases above, 
since false arrest is not specifically enumerated, it 
must come not under the one year statute of limitations, 
but rather under the four year general statute of limitations 
for all other types of actions. 
In deciding upon this important matter, it is 
well for the Court to remember what was stated veiy well 
in Hotaling v. General Electric Co., (1962) (N.Y.) 16 A.2d 
339, 228^.Y.S.2d 376 at page 379: 
Statutes of limitations are construed, 
where possible, so as to give the parties 
their day in court, and should not be 
defeated by overstrict construction such 
as the appellants would have us adopt in 
the present action. 
Though in the other cases it has been stated that 
statutes of limitations should be strictly construed, this 
states that they should not be so overstrict that they 
preclude a party to his day in court. This view was 
further endorsed in Callarama v. Associates Discount Corp. 
of Delaware, (1972) 329 N.Y.S.2d 711, 69 Misc.2d 287. 
In order to allow plaintiff his day in court the 
Court should operate on that oft-cited maxim of laws that 
If a substantial doubt exists as to which 
is the applicable statute of limitations, 
the longer rather than the shorter period 
of limitations is to be preferred. Hardings 
Co. v. Eimco Corp, 1 Utah 2d 320 
266 P.2d 494 at 323, citing 34 Am Jur, 
Limitations of Action, § 50. 
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This is further manifested in Sprung v« Rasmussen, 
supra, at page 433: 
Where two statutes of limitations are 
involved, the one giving the longer 
period to a litigant seeking relief is 
preferred and applied. 
The Court should note a case from New York, Huff v. 
State of New York, (1965) 263 N.Y. 2d 897, which stands for 
the proposition that although the claim arose at the time 
plaintiff was released from imprisonment and he must therefor 
serve a claim for false arrest against the state within ninety 
(90) days, the claim did not accrue until the claimant could 
fairly ascertain the damages he has sustained. 
The expression "claim accrued" is not identical 
with the expression "cause of action arose". The claim accrue-
when it matures, and the words "claim accrued" have the same 
meaning as "damages accrued". 
The claim did not accrue until the time of acquittal 
In applying these rules, it should be remembered 
by the Court that plaintiff was arrested on November 16, 19 74. 
The matter came to trial on February 25, 1975 and the 
Complaint in the matter was filed December 16, 1975, only 
one month past the claimed one year statute of limitations. 
Therefore, the Court in seeking to determine the applicable 
statute of limitations should see that only 10 months had 
passed since the termination of the trial in this matter. In 
no way is that a time in which'Witnesses could disappear, 
notes be lost and memories have faded." 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED 
UPON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE 
MATTER FOR TRIAL AND WITHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it 
is not necessary to state the facts showing 
the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, referring 
to or describing such statute specifically 
and definitely by section number, subsection 
designation, if any, or otherwise designating 
the provision relied uopn sufficiently clearly 
to identify it. If such allegation is 
controverted, the party pleading the statute 
must establish, on the trial, the facte 
showing that the cause of action is so barred, 
{emphasis supplied] 
Bv the rules of procedure where the allegations of 
statute of limitations or defense of statute of limitations 
is asserted, if controverted by the plaintiff, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is barred must be established at the 
trial upon the basis of the evidence presented. In this case 
now before the Court the trial court was premature in granting 
summary judgment of dismissal without hearing the evidence and 
making an evaluated distinction whether the action was one for 
false arrest, humiliation and damages or a simple case of 
false imprisonment as claimed by the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment to the defendants and against 
plaintiff in this action is contrary to the public policy 
of the courts in this state in allowing each litigant his 
-15-
day in court and the opportunity to present the substance 
of this case to an impartial jury. Plaintiff respectfully 
requests and asks the Supreme Court to reverse the ruling 
of the trial court and remand the case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of September, 
1976. 
M. Dayle Jefcs 
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